The Unified Model (UM) key agreement protocol is an efficient Diffie-Hellman scheme that has been included in many cryptographic standards, most recently in the NIST SP 800-56A standard. The UM protocol is believed to possess all important security attributes including key authentication and secrecy, resistance to unknown key-share attacks, forward secrecy, resistance to known-session key attacks, and resistance to leakage of ephemeral private keys, but is known to succumb to key-compromise impersonation attacks. In this paper we present a strengthening of the Canetti-Krawczyk security definition for key agreement that captures resistance to all important attacks that have been identified in the literature with the exception of key-compromise impersonation attacks. We then present a reductionist security proof that the UM protocol satisfies this new definition in the random oracle model under the Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption.
INTRODUCTION
The 'unified model' is a family of two-party Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols that has been standardized in ANSI X9.42 [1] , ANSI X9.63 [2] , and NIST SP 800-56A [15] . The core protocol in the family is a two-pass protocol where each party contributes a static (long-term) key pair and an ephemeral (one-time) key pair which are then used to derive the secret session key. The family of protocols is called the 'unified model' because there are natural variants of the core protocol that are suitable in certain scenarios, for example in email where the receiver only contributes a static key pair. In this paper we shall only consider the security of the core protocol which, for legacy reasons, is called 'dhHybrid1' when the underlying group is a DSA-type group, and 'Full unified model' when the underlying group is an elliptic curve group [15] . More precisely, we will consider a three-pass variant that consists of the core protocol augmented with key confirmation as specified in the SP 800-56A standard [15] . This variant is worthy of study because it possesses more security attributes than the other protocols in the unified model family and therefore is most likely to be deployed in applications that wish to be compliant with SP 800-56A. For simplicity, we will henceforth refer to this protocol as the Unified Model (UM) protocol.
We are aware of two previous papers [5, 9] that offered security proofs for variants of the UM protocol. In §2 we discuss the limitations of these security proofs. Then, in §3, we present a strengthening of the Canetti-Krawczyk model for secure key agreement [7] that we believe captures resistance to all important attacks that have been identified in the literature with the exception of key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks. (The desirable security properties of key agreement protocols are listed in Appendix A.) Resistance to KCI attacks is not incorporated in our security model because the UM protocol is known to succumb to these attacks. A complete description of the UM protocol is provided in §4. In §5 we present a reductionist security argument for the UM protocol in the random oracle model under the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption. Summary conclusions appear in §6.
PREVIOUS WORK
Let G = g denote a multiplicatively-written group of prime order q, and let G * = G \ {1}. (b, B) , and his ephemeral key pair is (y, Y ). We assume that parties can obtain authentic copies of each other's static public keys by exchanging certificates that have been issued by a trusted certifying authority (CA). Let H and H denote independent hash functions, and let MAC denote a message authentication code algorithm.
Protocol 1, the basic two-pass protocol upon which the UM protocol is built, is depicted in Figure 1 . The commu-
Figure 1: Protocol 1: Basic two-pass UM protocol.
nicating parties exchange static and ephemeral public keys and thereafter compute the session key k = H(g xy , g ab ) by hashing the concatenation of the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman shared secret σe = g xy and the static Diffie-Hellman shared secret σs = g ab . In [5] it was observed that this protocol is insecure under known-session key attacks.
The attack highlights the importance of authenticating the exchanged ephemeral public keys. This led to Protocol 2, shown in Figure 2 , and analyzed by Blake-Wilson, Johnson and Menezes [5] . In Protocol 2, the communicating parties
The variant of the UM protocol analyzed in [5] .
also exchange key confirmation tags t A , t B computed using the MAC key k = H (g xy , g ab ). If the tags verify, then the parties compute the session key k = H(g xy , g ab ). Protocol 2 succumbs to a KCI attack since an adversary who learnsÂ's static private key a can thereafter impersonateB (without knowing b) in a run of the protocol withÂ. While KCI resilience is certainly desirable in practice, it is arguably not a fundamental security requirement of key agreement.
1 Nevertheless, Protocol 2 appears to possess all the other desirable security attributes including key authentication and secrecy, resistance to unknown key-share attacks, forward secrecy, resistance to known-session key attacks, and resistance to leakage of ephemeral private keys. In [5] , the security model and definition developed by Bellare and Rogaway [4] for key agreement in the symmetric-key setting was adapted to the public-key setting. Protocol 2 was proven to be meet this security definition in the random oracle model assuming that the CDH problem in G is intractable and that the MAC scheme is secure. However, the security model and result in [5] have the following shortcomings:
(i) The security model does not incorporate forward secrecy.
(ii) While the adversary is allowed to learn a party's static private key and thereafter impersonate the party, the security proof does not permit the adversary to replace that party's key pair with a key pair of its own choosing. Hence the security proof does not rule out 'malicious insider' attacks such as Kaliski's online attack [10] . (However, the security proof in [5] can be modified to rule out malicious insider attacks by invoking the stronger GDH assumption.) (iii) The adversary is not allowed to learn any ephemeral private keys. More generally, the adversary is not allowed to learn any session-specific secret information (with the exception of session keys).
(iv) As observed by Rackoff (cf. [14] ), a deficiency of the Bellare-Rogaway model is that the adversary is not allowed to make any queries once it has issued the 'Test' query (where it is given either a session key or a randomly selected key).
More recently, Jeong, Katz and Lee [9] proposed and analyzed a variant of Protocol 1 depicted in Figure 3 whereby the ephemeral public keys and identities of the communicating parties are included in the key derivation function H. The Bellare-Rogaway security model was strengthened
Figure 3: Protocol 3: The variant of Protocol 1 analyzed in [9] .
in [9] to incorporate (weak) forward secrecy, and to allow the adversary to issue queries even after making a Test query. Protocol 3 was proven secure in the random oracle under the CDH assumption. However, the security model and result in [9] still have the shortcomings (ii) and (iii) described above.
In the next section, we strengthen the security model to incorporate forward secrecy, resistance to malicious insider attacks, and leakage of session-specific secret information.
SECURITY MODEL
In this section we present our strengthening of the Canetti-Krawczyk security definition for key agreement [7] . Our definition aims to capture all essential security properties of key agreement with the exception of KCI resilience.
2
The new definition can also be viewed as a weakening of the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) definition [12] (see also [16] ) by the exclusion of KCI resilience. Our definition has been crafted specifically to allow a reductionist security proof to be given for the UM protocol. We don't expect that the definition will be useful to assess the security of other key agreement protocols. Nonetheless, even though the new definition may appear to be contrived and have limited applications, we feel that the exercise of devising an appropriately strong security definition and providing a reductionist security proof for the UM protocol with respect to this definition is worthwhile given the importance of the UM protocol.
Preliminaries
In the model there are n parties each modeled by a probabilistic Turing machine. Each party has a static key pair together with a certificate that binds the public key to that party. We do not assume that the CA requires parties to prove possession of their static private keys, but we do insist that the CA verifies that the static public key of a party belongs to G * . Since we are primarily interested in analyzing the security of the UM protocol, we will only describe our model for three-round key agreement protocols where the initiatorÂ sendsB an ephemeral public key X in the first round,B responds with an ephemeral public key Y and key confirmation tag tB in the second round, andÂ sends its confirmation tag t A in the third round. The session key is obtained by combining A, B, X, Y and possibly the identifiersÂ,B.
In the following, we shall assume that all communicated messages are represented as binary strings. We denote by × a special symbol not in {0, 
Sessions
A partyÂ can be activated to create an instance of the protocol called a session. A session is created via an incoming message that has one of the following forms: (i) (Â,B) or (ii) (Â,B, Y ). IfÂ is activated with (Â,B) thenÂ is the session initiator, otherwise the session responder. IfÂ is the session initiator thenÂ creates a separate session state where all session-specific short-lived information is stored, and prepares an ephemeral public key X. The session is labeled active and identified via a (temporary and incomplete) session identifier s = (Â,B, X, ×, ×, ×). The outgoing message prepared byÂ is (B,Â, X). IfÂ is the session responder thenÂ creates a separate session state and prepares an ephemeral public key X and key confirmation tag t A . The session is labeled active and identified via (Â,B, Y, X, t A , ×).
The outgoing message is (B,Â, Y, X, t A ).
Since ephemeral keys are selected at random on a persession basis, the probability that an ephemeral public key X is chosen twice byÂ is negligible. Hence session identifiers are unique except with negligible probability. For a session (Â,B, CommA), we callÂ the session owner andB the session peer ; together,Â andB are referred to as the communicating parties. The owner of a session associates a label with the session to identify whether the owner is the session's initiator or responder. communicating partner's ephemeral private key. We believe, however, that our definition is the 'right' one for capturing all the essential security properties of the UM protocol.
A partyÂ can be activated to update an active session via an incoming message of the form (i) ( 
, then s can have at most one matching session (except with negligible probability) since ephemeral keys are chosen at random on a per-session basis.
A protocol may require parties to perform some checks on incoming messages. For example, ifÂ receives the message (Â,B, X, Y, tB), thenÂ may need to verify that Y ∈ G * and that tB satisfies some authentication condition. If a party is activated to create a session with an incoming message that does not meet the protocol specifications, then that message is rejected and no session is created. If a party is activated to update an active session with an incoming message that does not meet the protocol specifications, then the party deletes all information specific to that session (including the session state and the session key if it has been computed) and aborts the session.
At any point in time a session is in exactly one of the following states: active, completed, aborted.
Adversary
The adversary M is modeled as a probabilistic Turing machine and controls all communications. Parties submit outgoing messages to M, who makes decisions about their delivery. The adversary presents parties with incoming messages via Send(message), thereby controlling the activation of parties. The adversary does not have immediate access to a party's private information, however in order to capture possible leakage of private information M is allowed to make the following queries: 
M issued SessionKeyReveal(s).

M issued Corrupt(Â) before Expire(s).
M issued SessionStateReveal(s) and either
Corrupt(Â) or Corrupt(B).
s * exists and M issued one of the following: (a) SessionKeyReveal(s * ). (b) Corrupt(B) before Expire(s * ). (c) SessionStateReveal(s * ) and either Corrupt(Â) or Corrupt(B).
s * does not exist and M issued Corrupt(B) before Expire(s).
To capture the indistinguishability requirement, the adversary M is allowed to make a special query Test(s) to a fresh session s. In response, M is given with equal probability either the session key held by s or a random key. M meets its goal if it guesses correctly whether the key is random or not. Note that M can continue interacting with parties after issuing the Test query, but must ensure that the test session remains fresh throughout M's experiment.
Definition 2. A key agreement protocol is secure if the following conditions hold: 1. If two honest parties complete matching sessions then,
except with negligible probability, they both compute the same session key. 1 2 plus a negligible fraction.
No polynomially bounded adversary M can distinguish the session key of a fresh session from a randomly chosen session key, with probability greater than
One can see that Definition 2 overcomes the four shortcomings listed in Section 2. Although this new definition is not as strong as the eCK security definition [12] , we maintain that a reductionist security proof that a protocol satisfies Definition 2 can provide meaningful practical assurances. In particular, Definition 2 captures all elements of the Canetti-Krawczyk definition [7] , which has been accepted as a strong definition (see [8] ). In addition, it is stronger than the Canetti-Krawczyk definition in the following ways:
1. The SessionStateReveal query can be issued to the test session and also to its matching session.
2. The adversary can select its own static key pair for a corrupted party, thereby allowing the modeling of malicious insider attacks.
3. The test session does not have to be unexpired at the time when the Test query is issued.
4. A party is allowed to execute the protocol with itself.
PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section we give a complete description of the UM protocol which, as mentioned earlier, is the dhHybrid1/Full unified model with key confirmation as described in SP 800-56A [15] .
In the following, Λ denotes optional public information that can be included in the key derivation function (KDF) H, R is the fixed string "KC 2 U", and I is the fixed string "KC 2 V". To establish a session key, partiesÂ andB do the following: We will henceforth assume that the adversary cannot issue a SessionStateReveal, Expire, SessionKeyReveal or Corrupt query while a party is executing one of the four main steps of the protocol. That is, the adversary can only issue one of these queries at the end of steps 1, 2, 3 or 4. This means that a SessionStateReveal query can yield x (at the end of step 1) or k (at the end of step 2), but not y. In order to account for possible loss of y to the adversary via a sidechannel attack or the use of a weak pseudorandom number generator, we will henceforth assume that the adversary can learn y by issuing a SessionStateReveal query at the end of step 2 even though step 2 stipulates that y be deleted.
SECURITY PROOF
For simplicity we first consider the case Λ = (X, Y ), where X and Y are the exchanged ephemeral public keys. We also assume that a party does not initiate a session with itself. These restrictions will be relaxed in §5.4 and §5.5.
Theorem 1. Suppose that G is a group where the GDH assumption holds, that the MAC scheme is secure, and that H is modeled as a random oracle. Then the UM protocol is secure in the sense of Definition 2.
Proof. Condition 1 of Definition 2 can be easily verified. We now prove that condition 2 of Definition 2 is satisfiedthat no polynomially bounded adversary can distinguish the session key of a fresh session from a randomly chosen session key. Let λ denote the security parameter, and let M be a polynomially (in λ) bounded adversary. We assume that M succeeds in an environment with n parties, activates a party to create a session at most t times, and terminates after time T M . Here, n and t are bounded by polynomials in λ. Let M denote the event that M succeeds, and suppose that p(λ) is non-negligible. We will show how M can be used to construct a polynomial-time algorithm S that, with non-negligible probability of success, solves a CDH instance (U, V ) or breaks the MAC scheme.
Since H is a random function, M has two possible strategies for winning its distinguishing game with probability significantly greater than ab . Also, ξ : G × G → G is a random function known only to S and such that ξ(X, Y ) = ξ(Y, X) for all X, Y ∈ G. The algorithm S, which simulates M's environment, will use ξ(U, Z) to 'represent' CDH(U, Z) in situations where S does not know log g U . Except with negligible probability, M will not detect that ξ(U, Z) is being used instead of CDH(U, Z).
Event E1
We use M to construct an algorithm S that succeeds with non-negligible probability provided that the event M * ∧ E1 occurs with non-negligible probability.
S establishes n parties, who are assigned random static key pairs, and selects s 1 , s 2 ∈ R [1, . . . , nt] . The s 1 'th and s 2 'th sessions created will be called s U and s V , respectively. The adversary M is activated on this set of n parties. We next describe the actions of S when M activates a party or issues a query. Send(Â,B) . S executes step 1 of the protocol. However, if the session being created is the s 1 'th or s 2 'th session, then S deviates from the protocol description by setting the ephemeral public key X to be U or V , respectively; note that S does not possess the corresponding ephemeral private key in this case.
1.
Send(B,Â, X)
. S executes step 2 of the protocol. However, if the session being created is the s 1 'th or s 2 'th session, then S deviates from the protocol description by setting the ephemeral public key Y to be U or V , respectively, and setting σe = ξ(Y, X); note that S does not possess the corresponding ephemeral private key in this case.
Send(Â,B, X, Y, t B )
. S executes step 3 of the protocol. However, if X ∈ {U, V }, then S deviates from the protocol description by setting σ e = ξ(X, Y ).
Send(B,Â, X, Y, t B , t A )
. S executes step 4 of the protocol.
SessionStateReveal(s). S answers the query faithfully except if s ∈ {s
U , s V } in which case S aborts with failure.
6. Expire(s). S answers the query faithfully.
SessionKeyReveal(s). S answers the query faithfully
except if s ∈ {s U , s V } in which case S aborts with failure.
Corrupt(Â). IfÂ owns session s
U or s V , and that session is not expired, then S aborts with failure. Otherwise, S answers the query faithfully. (c) S simulates a random oracle in the usual way.
Test(s). If s ∈ {s
U , s V } or if s U and s V are nonmatching, then S aborts with failure. Otherwise, S answers the query faithfully.
Analysis
S's simulation of M's environment is perfect except with negligible probability. The probability that M selects one of s U , s V as the test session and the other as its matching session is least 2/(nt) 2 . Suppose that this is indeed the case, and suppose that event M * ∧ E1 occurs. Then S does not abort as described in steps 5 and 10. Furthermore, since the test session is fresh, S does not abort as described in steps 7 and 8.
Except with negligible probability of guessing ξ(U, V ), a successful M must query H with (CDH (U, V ), CDH(A, B),Â,B, X, Y ) where {X, Y } = {U, V }, in which case S is successful as described in step 9(a). The probability that S is successful is bounded by
where negligible terms are ignored. During the simulation, S performs group exponentiations and MAC computations, accesses the DDH oracle, and simulates a random oracle. Let q = Θ(2 λ ). Then a group exponentiation takes time T G = O(λ) group multiplications. We assume that a MAC computation, a DDH oracle call, and a response to an H query take polynomial time, TMAC(λ), TDDH(λ), and TH (λ), respectively. The running time TS of S is therefore bounded by
Event E2
Let F be the event "s m does not exist and M does not issue SessionStateReveal(s t )". We further subdivide event E2 into the following complementary events:
E2a. E2 ∧ F .
E2b. E2 ∧ F .
Let p2a(λ) = Pr(M * ∧ E2a) and p 2b (λ) = Pr(M * ∧ E2b), whence p 2 = p 2a + p 2b . If event M * ∧ E2 occurs with nonnegligible probability, then either M * ∧ E2a or M * ∧ E2b occurs with non-negligible probability. The events E2a and E2b are considered in §5.2.1 and §5.2.2. In both cases, S establishes n parties. Two of these parties, denotedÛ and V , are randomly selected and assigned static public keys U and V , respectively. (Note that S does not know the corresponding static private keys.) The other n − 2 parties are assigned random static key pairs.
Event E2a
We use M to construct an algorithm S that succeeds with non-negligible probability provided that the event M * ∧E2a occurs with non-negligible probability.
The adversary M is activated on the set of n parties. We next describe the actions of S when M activates a party or issues a query. 
Send(Â,B
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have provided a reductionist security argument for the UM protocol with respect to a strengthened version of the Canetti-Krawczyk definition for secure key agreement. Our reduction is not tight, but that is perhaps unavoidable given that there can be many parties and sessions. It is also not clear how, given a desired security level, one can use our reduction to derive concrete recommendations for the parameters of the cryptographic ingredients. An outstanding open problem is to design a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol that: (i) is as efficient as the UM protocol; (ii) has a natural one-pass variant; and (iii) has a 'tight' reductionist security proof with respect to the eCK definition that is relatively simple and intuitive, and makes only standards assumptions (such as the CDH or DDH assumptions).
6. Resistance to leakage of ephemeral private keys. The security of session keys is not affected even though the adversary is able to learn one or more ephemeral private keys. In practice, such ephemeral private key leakage may occur by the use of a weak random number generator, by a side-channel attack, or if the adversary is able to physically extract the keys from a party's (lesssecure) memory.
